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ABSTRACT
ObjectivesToassesstheriskoftransmissionofpandemic
A/H1N1 2009 influenza (pandemic A/H1N1) from an
infected high school group to other passengers on an
airline flight and the effectiveness of screening and
follow-up of exposed passengers.
Design Retrospective cohort investigation using a
questionnaireadministeredtopassengersandlaboratory
investigation of those with symptoms.
Setting Auckland, New Zealand, with national and
international follow-up of passengers.
Participants Passengers seated in the rear section of a
Boeing 747-400 long haul flight that arrived on 25 April
2009, including a group of 24 students and teachers and
97 (out of 102) other passengers in the same section of
the plane who agreed to be interviewed.
Main outcomemeasuresLaboratory confirmedpandemic
A/H1N1 infection in susceptible passengers within 3.
2 days of arrival; sensitivity and specificity of influenza
symptomsforconfirmedinfection;andcompletenessand
timeliness of contact tracing.
Results Nine members of the school group were
laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic A/H1N1
infection and had symptoms during the flight. Two other
passengers developed confirmed pandemic A/H1N1
infection, 12 and 48 hours after the flight. They reported
no other potential sources of infection. Their seating was
within two rows of infected passengers, implying a risk of
infection of about 3.5% for the 57 passengers in those
rows. All but one of the confirmed pandemic A/H1N1
infected travellers reported cough, but more complex
definitions of influenza cases had relatively low
sensitivity. Rigorous follow-up by public health workers
located93%ofpassengers,butonly52%werecontacted
within 72 hours of arrival.
ConclusionsA low butmeasurable risk of transmissionof
pandemic A/H1N1 exists during modern commercial air
travel. This risk is concentrated close to infected
passengers with symptoms. Follow-up and screening of
exposed passengers is slow and difficult once they have
left the airport.
INTRODUCTION
The containment phase of the New Zealand (NZ) pan-
demicinfluenzaplanproposesthatarrivingairlinepas-
sengers with suspected influenza and their in-flight
contacts should be identified and managed to reduce
theriskofimportationofdisease.
1Thepandemicplans
of some other countries include similar measures.
2
However, little documented evidence exists of influ-
enza transmissionduring flights.Arecentreview iden-
tified only three “influenza” outbreaks on aircraft.
3
One was not laboratory confirmed,
4 and the other
two occurred before regulations on ventilation for
commercial aircraft were published.
56
On 25 April 2009 the World Health Organization
declared the outbreak of novel pandemic A/H1N1
2009 influenza (pandemic A/H1N1) to be a “public
health emergency of international concern.”
7 On that
same day, a general practitioner in NZ identified cases
of influenza-like illness in a group of high school stu-
dentswho,returningfromathreeweektriptoMexico,
had disembarked off a flight from Los Angeles to
Auckland six hours previously. Twelve of the group
reported symptoms of influenza during the flight, and
nineofthesewerelaterconfirmedasNZ’sfirstcasesof
pandemicA/H1N1.Aftertheterminationoftheflight,
twofurthermembersofthegroupandthreepassengers
outside the group developed symptoms of influenza.
This timing raised the possibility that these were cases
of in-flight infection with influenza.
This investigation therefore aimed to assess the risk
oftransmissionofpandemicA/H1N1onthislonghaul
flight to NZ. Secondary aims were to assess the effec-
tiveness of potential questions about symptoms for
identifying cases at the border and the effectiveness of
contact tracing measures. The overall goal was to
informbordercontrolmethodsforuse duringthe con-
tainment phase of pandemic management.
METHODS
Study design, participants, and main outcome measures
This study was a retrospective cohort investigation of
the risk of transmission of influenza during a commer-
cialairlineflight.Thecohortconsistedofallpassengers
seated in the rear section of the aircraft, with a further
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viewing and testing for pandemic A/H1N1. The
main outcome measure was the incidence of in-flight
infection with pandemic A/H1N1. Secondary out-
come measures were the sensitivity and specificity of
symptoms of influenza for identifying laboratory con-
firmed cases and the completeness and timeliness of
contact tracing.
Initial public health response
The initial public health response focused on control-
ling transmission from the high school group. Naso-
pharyngeal swabs were obtained from those with
symptoms of influenza. After identification of influ-
enza A in members of the group, the decision was
made to trace all passengers on the flight and manage
them to contain the spread of influenza (with the
recommended protocol including nasopharyngeal
swabs from those with symptoms, home isolation or
quarantine, and antiviral post-exposure prophylaxis
or treatment as appropriate). A flight manifest was
obtained from the airline and arrival cards from immi-
gration authorities in Auckland to identify passengers
and their onward travel plans. Details were circulated
to NZ public health units in the respective districts or
international destinations in receiving countries.
Follow-up investigation
A follow-up investigation began during the week of 4
May 2009. All members of the high school group were
interviewed with a standard questionnaire covering ill-
ness and history of symptoms before, during, and after
theflight.Follow-upserologicalspecimenswerealsocol-
lectedfromthe student group 16-23 days after the flight.
The affected students were seated in the rear section
of the aircraft, so this population became the focus of
the retrospective cohort study. We used the seating
planandpassengerliststoconstructarecordofallpas-
sengersinthissection.Weretrievedthefollowingdata
on these passengers from public health units involved
in the initial response: symptoms during and after the
flight,resultsofanylaboratorytestingforpandemicA/
H1N1, timeliness and types of public health manage-
ment. We re-interviewed passengers who reported
symptoms, and those for whom no symptom history
was recorded, by using a standard questionnaire. For
assessment of the public health response, we defined
passengers as having been “in transit” if they departed
foranotherinternationaldestinationwithin24hoursof
arrivalorasNZresidentsorvisitorsaccordingtoinfor-
mation collected during immigration processing. We
used EpiInfo version 3.5.1 to analyse data.
Theairlinefollowedupcabincrewbyusingthesame
protocol as we used for passengers. We did not use
resultsfromthisgroupinthisstudybecausewewanted
to link the presence or absence of in-flight infection to
seating locations, which were not applicable to mobile
flight attendants. No illnesses were reported among
cabin crew.
Laboratory analysis
We placed nasopharyngeal and throat swabs in viral
transport media and tested them by a real time poly-
merase chain reaction matrix assay for influenza A
using primers from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Atlanta, USA. We used an ABI 7000
Sequence Detection System (Applied Biosystems) for
amplificationasfollows:reversetranscription50°Cfor
20 minutes, Taq inhibitor inactivation 95°C for two
minutes followed by 45 cycles of polymerase chain
reaction amplification, 95°C for 15 seconds, and 55°
Cfor50seconds.Wesentspecimenspositiveforinflu-
enza A RNA to a WHO collaborating centre for refer-
enceandresearchoninfluenza(Melbourne,Australia).
Confirmatory testing was done by sequencing of the
matrix, haemagglutinin, and neuraminidase genes for
comparison with published influenza A sequences in
GenBank or by real time polymerase chain reaction
using primers that discriminate pandemic A/H1N1
and seasonal influenza A/H1N1, A/H3N2, and B
sequences.
Sera were treated with enzymes that destroy recep-
tors and assayed by haemagglutination inhibition
using1%turkeyredbloodcellsforthepresenceofanti-
bodies against reference viruses A/Auckland/1/2009
(pandemicA/H1N1)andA/Brisbane/59/2007(seaso-
nal A/H1N1) at the WHO collaborating centre. Sero-
conversion was defined as a fourfold rise in titre of
haemagglutination inhibition between the acute and
the convalescent serum or, when only one sample
was available, the presence of a titre of at least 80
against A/Auckland/1/2009.
Case definitions
We considered passengers to have influenza-like ill-
ness if they had any two of fever or feverishness,
cough, sore throat, or rhinorrhoea. We considered
them laboratory confirmed if the nasopharyngeal
swab was positive for pandemic A/H1N1, serology
Laboratory confirmed symptomatic case during flight
Suspected symptomatic case during flight
Laboratory confirmed post-flight case
Suspected post-flight case
Empty seat
Unknown status
Immune
Non-case
Seating plan of rear section of aircraft showing passengers according to their infection
category and seating position
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both.
Weconsideredapassengertobeapost-flightcaseof
influenza if they developed laboratory confirmed or
suspected influenza within a plausible incubation per-
iod after the flight. Assuming an incubation period of
0.6 to 3.2 days (based on values reported for influenza
A
8) and given a flight duration of 13 hours, this meant
that illness from exposure on the flight could begin at
anytimeafterarrivalinNZto3.2days(77hours)later.
We divided passengers into categories of pandemic
A/H1N1infection onthe basisoftheircombinationof
symptoms, timing of symptoms, and laboratory
results, as follows.
Laboratory confirmed symptomatic case during flight—
Influenza-like illness starting within two weeks before
or during the flight with at least one infectious symp-
tom(cough,sneeze, rhinorrhoea) persistingduringthe
flight and nasopharyngeal swab or serology positive
for pandemic A/H1N1.
Suspectedsymptomaticcaseduringflight—Influenza-like
illness starting within two weeks before or during the
flight with at least one infectious symptom (cough,
sneeze, rhinorrhoea) persisting during the flight and
pandemic A/H1N1 not excluded (laboratory investi-
gation for pandemic A/H1N1 either not done or
incomplete).
Immune case—Symptoms of influenza-like illness
before the flight, no infectious symptoms related to
this illness during the flight, and serology positive for
pandemic A/H1N1.
Laboratoryconfirmedpost-flightcase—Influenza-likeill-
ness starting within 3.2 days of arrival in NZ and naso-
pharyngealswaborserologypositiveforpandemicA/
H1N1.
Suspected post-flight case—Influenza-like illness start-
ing within 3.2 days of arrival in NZ and pandemic A/
H1N1 not excluded (laboratory investigation for pan-
demic A/H1N1 either not done or incomplete).
Non-case—No symptoms of influenza during or after
the flight, or symptoms of influenza during or after the
flight and pandemic A/H1N1 excluded (laboratory
investigations negative for pandemic A/H1N1).
Unknown status—Could not be contacted or insuffi-
cient information to assign to another category.
We considered a laboratory confirmed post-flight
case to be a case of in-flight infection if they had no
other plausible sources of pandemic A/H1N1 infec-
tion (before or after the flight). In addition, we defined
pandemic A/H1N1 susceptible passengers as those
who were seated in the rear section of the plane,
excluding laboratory confirmed and suspected cases
during the flight, immune cases, and those with
unknown status. This susceptible group became the
cohort for calculating the risk of in-flight infection
with influenza.
RESULTS
Proportion of passengers successfully followed-up
The high school group had arrived on a Boeing 747-
400 with a total capacity of 379 passengers. Of the 128
seatsintherearsectionoftheplane,126wereoccupied
by passengers, including 24 by the high school group
(22studentsandtwoteachers).Allmembersofthehigh
school group were interviewed. Eight of the 24 gave
nasopharyngeal swabs, and 23 gave serological speci-
mens.
Oftheremainingpassengersintherearsectionofthe
aircraft, information on influenza symptoms during
and after the flight was collected from 95% (97/102)
as part of the initial response or during follow-up.
Nasopharyngeal swabs were obtained from 26 of
these passengers (14 of whom had symptoms). (See
web table A for further details of laboratory testing.)
Incidence of pandemic A/H1N1 in passengers
Table 1showsthedistributionofpassengersaccording
to categories of pandemic A/H1N1 infection. Out of a
total of 121 passengers with known illness status nine
were laboratory confirmed symptomatic cases during
the flight. All were in the school group. Three further
passengers with influenza-like illness and symptoms
during the flight were incompletely investigated: one
was a member of the school group (influenza A on
nasopharyngeal swab, no pandemic A/H1N1 typing,
serology not done); the remaining two were other pas-
sengers(nasopharyngealswabtestingnotdone).These
threewerecategorisedassuspectedsymptomaticcases
during the flight.
Five passengers developed influenza-like illness
after the flight. One of them developed symptoms six
daysafterarrivingandsowasexcluded.Theremaining
four developed symptoms within 3.2 days of arriving
in NZ and so met the case definition for post-flight
cases. Of these, three were laboratory confirmed and
one had incomplete pandemic A/H1N1 investigation
(seewebappendixfordetailsoftheseindividualcases).
Characteristics of passengers with pandemic A/H1N1
The figure shows the seating position of all the passen-
gers and distinguishes them according to the categories
ofpandemicA/H1N1infectionusedintable 1.Allfour
Table 1 |Status of 126 passengers in rear section of aircraft, according to pandemic A/H1N1
infection categories. Values are numbers (percentages)
Status*
School group
(n=24)
Other passengers
(n=102)
Laboratory confirmed symptomatic case during flight 9 (38) 0
Suspected symptomatic case during flight 1 (4) 2 (2)
Immune case 2 (8) 0
Laboratory confirmed post-flight case† 1( 4 ) 2( 2 )
Suspected post-flight case† 1( 4 ) 0
Non-case†‡ 10 (42) 93 (91)
Unknown status 0 5 (5)
*See methods for definitions.
†Categories that formed cohort of pandemic A/H1N1 susceptible passengers used in subsequent analysis of
influenza transmission risk (n=107).
‡Comprised 86 passengers who reported no symptoms of influenza-like illness (fever or feverishness, cough,
sore throat, or rhinorrhoea), seven passengers who reported symptoms but who did not meet case definition for
influenza-like illness, nine passengers who met case definition but had negative nasopharyngeal swabs, and
one student who was asymptomatic and had negative serology but was positive for pandemic A/H1N1 on
nasopharyngeal swab.
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firmed symptomatic A/H1N1 cases. The nine labora-
tory confirmed symptomatic cases during the flight
and four post-flight cases were all in the 10-19 year age
group. Web table B shows further demographic and
travel history details of the passengers.
Risk of in-flight infection with pandemic A/H1N1
Two passengers (A and B in the web appendix) with
laboratory confirmed post-flight infection did not
have another plausible source of infection and there-
foremetourcriteriaforin-flightinfection.PassengerA
developed symptoms of influenza 12 hours after the
flight,andpassengerBbecameill48hoursafterarrival
in NZ. Two others (C and D in the web appendix) also
became ill after the flight. One (passenger C) could
potentially have been infected before travel from
other members of the student group and so is best
described as possible in-flight infection. The timing of
onsetofsymptomsoftheother(passengerD)excluded
infection before travel, but this case also remains
inconclusive because the laboratory investigation was
incomplete.
Table 1summarisesthesusceptiblecohort.Wecon-
sidered107 passengersseated in the rearsection of the
planetobesusceptibletopandemicA/H1N1infection
during the flight on the basis of excluding laboratory
confirmedcasesduringtheflight(n=9),suspectedcases
during the flight (n=3), immune cases (n=2), and those
with unknown status (n=5). Of the susceptible popula-
tion,57wereseatedwithintworowsoflaboratorycon-
firmed symptomatic cases during the flight.
We estimated the overall risk of in-flight infection in
therearsectionoftheplanetobe1.9%(95%confidence
interval 0.3% to 6.0%). For the 57 passengers sitting
within two rows of the laboratory confirmed sympto-
matic casesthe riskwashigherat3.5% (0.6%to11.1%).
Symptoms reported by pandemic A/H1N1 cases
Table 2 shows the prevalence of symptoms reported
by passengers in the rear section of the aircraft during
the period from the start of the flight until four days
after its arrival. One symptom (cough) was very sensi-
tive(92.3%)forpandemicA/H1N1infection,hadrela-
tively high specificity (78.8%), and had moderate
positive predictive value (63.2%). The surveillance
casedefinitionforinfluenza-likeillnessusedintheUni-
ted States had low sensitivity (38.5%), high specificity
(90.9%), and moderate positive predictive value
(62.5%).
8 The screening case definition of influenza-
like illness subsequently used for detecting potentially
infected arriving passengers in NZ was more sensitive
(61.5%)thantheUSdefinitionbuthadlowerspecificity
(72.7%) and positive predictive value (47.1%).
Effectiveness of contact tracing
TheNewZealandMinistryofHealthintroducedacon-
tact tracing protocol shortly after this flight arrived in
NZ. This protocol advised that contacts should be
located rapidly and interviewed, have a nasopharyn-
geal swab if respiratory symptoms were present, be
givenacourseofoseltamivir(thiswasafivedaycourse
regardless of symptoms), and be put into home isola-
tion or quarantine for 72 hours from the start of oselta-
mivir treatment. This investigation assessed the extent
and timeliness of this follow-up.
The results (table 3) show that follow-up was rela-
tively complete but not particularly timely. Nearly all
(93%) of the passengers outside the initially identified
school group received public health service follow-up,
Table 2 |Symptoms reported by passengers in rear section of aircraft who were subsequently investigated for pandemic A/
H1N1 infection by nasopharyngeal swab or serology (n=46)*. Values are numbers (percentages)
Pandemic A/H1N1 positive cases (n=13) Pandemic A/H1N1 negative (n=33)
Symptoms present Symptoms absent Symptoms present Symptoms absent
Individual symptoms† †
Feverishness 5 (38) 8 (62) 4 (12) 29 (88)
Sore throat 4 (31) 9 (69) 11 (33) 22 (67)
Runny nose/rhinorrhoea 4 (31) 9 (69) 5 (15) 28 (85)
Cough 12 (92) 1 (8) 7 (21) 26 (79)
Diarrhoea 3 (23) 10 (77) 0 33 (100)
Headache 4 (31) 9 (69) 4 (12) 29 (88)
Generally unwell 4 (31) 9 (69) 3 (9) 30 (91)
Symptom combinations
ILI-US‡ 5 (38) 8 (62) 3 (9) 30 (91)
ILI-NZ§ 8 (62) 5 (38) 9 (27) 24 (73)
At least one symptom 12 (92) 1 (8) 13 (39) 20 (61)
ILI=influenza-like illness.
*Restricted to 46 passengers with laboratory investigation results; excluded seven passengers with one or more symptoms of ILI during or after flight
who did not have adequate laboratory investigation to exclude pandemic A/H1N1 infection and two school group members considered immune
owing to previous pandemic A/H1N1 infection; included 21 passengers who were asymptomatic and one of who had a positive throat swab but
negative serology for pandemic A/H1N1.
†Excludes individual symptoms reported by only one pandemic A/H1N1 positive case (one each for sneezing, red eyes, nausea, vomiting, muscle
pain, and nose bleed) or not reported by any cases (shortness of breath, joint pain).
‡Fever or feverishness plus cough or sore throat.
§Any two of fever or feverishness, cough, sore throat, and rhinorrhoea.
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Only 52% were followed up by public health services
within72hours.Onceidentified,81%(77/95)received
thefullrecommendedpublichealthmanagement.Fol-
low-up was less complete for visitors and people tran-
siting through NZ.
DISCUSSION
Thisinvestigationprovidesevidencethattransmission
of influenza can occur during modern commercial air
travel. The risk seems to be concentrated among those
people seated within two rows of infected passengers
withsymptoms,whichisconsistentwithin-flighttrans-
mission of other respiratory infections.
39Our findings
also show some of the difficulties and limitations of
screening at entry to a country and public health fol-
low-up of airline passengers during the containment
stage of a pandemic response.
Thedirectdetectionofvirusbymoleculartestingfor
pandemic A/H1N1 virus or detection of specific anti-
bodies to the virus in serum provided a high degree of
certaintythatlaboratoryconfirmedsymptomaticcases
were true cases of pandemic A/H1N1 infection. Alter-
natives to in-flight infection were unlikely. At the time
of this episode, the global pandemic was at an early
stage, so the numbers of infected people outside Mex-
ico were relatively small.
10 Infection in New Zealand
was exceedingly unlikely, as no other cases had been
detected in NZ at that time.
11
The timing of onset of symptoms provides further
evidence that infection occurred during the flight. If
pandemic A/H1N1 behaves like other influenza A
viruses, we can assume an incubation period of about
1.4-1.9 days, with a range from about 0.6 days to 3.
2 days.
7 Both cases of in-flight infection with influenza
would be consistent with this incubation period. Case
A (symptom onset within 12 hours of returning to NZ)
could have been infected during any part of the flight,
although this range would also be consistent with
infection before boarding. For case B (symptom onset
48 hours after arriving in NZ), infection before board-
ing would have been possible only at the upper
extreme of the plausible incubation period. Infection
during boarding or disembarking would also have
been possible, although far less likely because of the
relatively short periods of exposure involved.
Severalpotentialmodesoftransmissionofinfluenza
exist(airborneaerosol,largedroplet,direct contact,or
indirect contact via contaminated surfaces and
fomites).
12 Their relative importance for transmission
of influenza remains contentious.
12-15 This investiga-
tion cannot establish the exact mode of transmission
thatoccurredonthisflight.Thecloseproximityofpas-
sengers A and B to the infectious students would be
compatible with all of these modes of transmission
(including “short range aerosol transmission”
15) rather
than airborne aerosol transmission through the venti-
lation system. This pattern of transmission from
nearby passengers is consistent with another reported
case of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 during a
flight in June 2009, in which the infected person had
satwithintworowsofthesourcecase,
16aswellastrans-
mission of other respiratory agents in this
environment.
3
Limitations of study
A limitation of the investigation was that during the
initial response phase passengers were interviewed by
several personnel, so this process was not as complete
and uniform as would be desirable. Some characteris-
tics, notably symptoms, may therefore have been
under-reported, which could have reduced case ascer-
tainment.Timedelaysininterviewingwouldhavepro-
duced further recall bias, again probably lowering
reporting of symptoms. Incomplete laboratory testing
ofpassengersintherearsectionoftheplanemeansthat
some infected passengers, particularly those with mild
symptoms or who were asymptomatic, could have
been missed. The course of oseltamivir offered to
most of the passengers might also have suppressed
symptoms in some (although treatment generally
startedseveraldaysafterarrival,sothiseffectwasprob-
ably small). Our case definition for in-flight transmis-
sionwasconservative.Onbalance,thesourcesoferror
in this investigation would tend to underestimate the
risk of in-flight transmission of pandemic A/H1N1.
Implications of findings
This investigation provides insights into the control
measures that are needed during the containment
phase of a pandemic response when air travel can
rapidly disseminate new infections.
1718 Some equivo-
cal evidence from the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic indi-
cates that countries which implemented entry
screening may have briefly delayed local transmission
ofthisvirus.
19Findingsfromthisinvestigationsupport
the practice of focusing attention on passengers seated
near potentially infectious travellers, rather than fol-
lowing up all passengers on a flight. This episode also
suggests that greater effort could be applied to exit
Table 3 |Extent, timing, and completeness of public health follow-up of 102 exposed
passengers in rear section of aircraft*. Values are numbers (percentages)
Follow-up
NZ residents
(n=74)
Visitors
(n=19)
Transiting through
NZ (n=9)
Total
(n=102)
Public health follow-up†:
Yes 74 (100) 18 (95) 3 (33) 95 (93)
No 0 1 (5) 6 (67) 7 (7)
Timing of first contact†:
<24 hours 0 0 0 0
24-<48 hours 2 (3) 0 0 2 (2)
48-<72 hours 43 (58) 8 (42) 0 51 (50)
≥72 hours 29 (39) 10 (53) 3 (33) 42 (41)
Completeness of public health follow-up:
Swab taken (if symptoms present)‡ 10 (71) 2 (100) 1 (50) 13 (72)
Homeisolationorquarantinerequested† 73 (99) 10 (53) 2 (22) 85 (83)
Oseltamivir offered† 69 (93) 11 (58) 3 (33) 83 (81)
NZ=New Zealand.
*Excluded school group of students and teachers.
†Percentages followed up calculated on basis of total 102 passengers.
‡Percentages calculated on basis of 18 passengers for whom collection of a swab was appropriate because
influenza symptoms were present.
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symptomsboardaircraft.Inthisinstance,10members
of the high school group had symptoms when they
embarkedataUSairport.Modellingofairportscreen-
ing for pandemic influenza also supports the greater
effectiveness of screening at the point of
embarkation.
20
This investigation does not suggest that the airline
cabin environment is a high risk setting for transmis-
sion of influenza. The long-haul flight included nine
infectious travellers, and it could be argued that the
number of secondary cases was relatively small in
comparison. This finding may reflect evidence that
pandemic A/H1N1 virus has relatively low
transmissibility.
21 The number of in-flight infections
was also somewhat lower than would be predicted
using estimates from a recent quantitative microbial
risk assessment of within flight transmission of influ-
enzaA(H1N1).
22However,asnoted,ourinvestigation
methods would have tended to underestimate the risk.
Findings from this investigation also provide some
information about the potential effectiveness of screen-
ing arriving passengers for symptoms of influenza.
Although based on small numbers, one symptom
(cough) seemed to be relatively sensitive for detecting
cases subsequently found to be infected with pandemic
A/H1N1. Combinations of symptoms (such as the NZ
or US definitions of influenza-like illness) reduced the
sensitivity of screening without greatly improving its
positive predictive value. These findings are based on
small numbers of passengers screened during the early
phaseoftheA/H1N1pandemic.Theyarealsobasedon
a singleatypicalflightthatcontainedanunusuallylarge
numberofcasesofinfluenza.Largerstudiesare needed
to assess the generalisability of these results to other
influenza viruses, populations, seasons, and settings.
Similarly, this investigation provides some insights
into the effectiveness of follow-up of passengers after
arrival. As part of an extensive public health response,
follow-up of these arriving passengers was relatively
complete for residents of and visitors to NZ but less
so for those transiting to other countries (mainly
Australia). Nevertheless, this follow-up was not
particularly timely; only 52% were followed up within
72 hours. Because this event came at the start of the
pandemic, systems were not in place to support public
healthfollow-up.Subsequently,allpassengersarriving
in NZ airports were required to complete a detailed
locator card.
Further research needs
Future investigations of airline transmission of influ-
enza could be improved in several ways. In particular,
collecting suitable laboratory specimens (such as con-
valescent serological samples) from all passengers in
the same section of the aircraft—not just those with
symptoms—would be useful to obtain a more valid
estimate of the risk of transmission of influenza in
these settings. Trying to put such interventions in per-
spective by assessing their overall effectiveness at
delaying the introduction of pandemic influenza into
more isolated countries, such as New Zealand, would
also be useful, as would estimating the resources
needed for such prevention and control measures.
Conclusions
This investigation suggests the existence of a low but
measurableriskoftransmissionofpandemicinfluenza
during modern commercial air travel. This risk is con-
centrated close to infected passengers with symptoms.
Screening of arriving passengers for symptoms may
need to focus on the presence of single symptoms
(such as cough) to achieve a moderate degree of sensi-
tivity. Follow-up of passengers can be difficult once
they leave the airport, even when public health autho-
rities mount a vigorous response. For island countries
and those with limited entry points, such border con-
trolmeasuresmayhavearoleindelayingintroduction
andspreadwithinthecommunityduringtheearlycon-
tainment phase of a pandemic. However, the effort
applied to such strategies needs to take into considera-
tion the seriousness of the pandemic, the effectiveness
ofbordercontrolmeasures,andtheresourcesrequired
to operate them.
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